According to these scholars, the hadiths that contain a threat may be cited, in an unqualified manner, to prove that an act is forbidden; however, the threat of punishment itself is not considered established by them unless the text yields a definitive indication.

A comparable illustration is the practice of most scholars who adduce the variant readings that have been authentically transmitted from certain Companions—even though those readings are not found in the muṣḥaf compiled under ʿUthmān, may Allah be pleased with him. Such readings convey both practical and doctrinal guidance, yet each of them rests on a single sound report. The scholars therefore relied on them to affirm points of practice, but did not regard them as Qurʾānic text, for the latter is a matter of doctrinal knowledge that can only be confirmed with certainty.

By contrast, the majority of jurists—and this is the position of virtually the entire early generation—hold that these hadiths constitute binding proof for everything they contain, including the threat itself. The Companions of Allah’s Messenger ﷺ and the Successors after them continuously used these reports both to establish the threatened punishment and to derive practical rulings, explicitly stating that, in general, the doer is liable to the threat mentioned therein. This stance is widely attested in their narrations and legal verdicts.

Their reasoning is that the threat forms part of the Sharʿī rulings: at times it is established by outward, probabilistic evidence, and at other times by definitive proof. What the Law requires is not perfect, absolute certainty regarding the threat; rather, it demands a conviction that reaches the level of certainty or strong predominance—just as this is what is required for practical rulings.