for example, many scholars of Kufah would set aside a sound hadith in favour of what they regarded as the Qur’an’s plain sense, holding that the Qur’an’s outward wording—its general statements and the like—must be given precedence over the explicit wording of a hadith. Yet they might deem something to be “plain” when in reality it is not, given the many possible layers of linguistic indication.

On that basis they rejected the hadith of “a single witness plus an oath,” even though other scholars know that nothing in the Qur’an’s apparent sense forbids ruling on the basis of a witness and an oath; and even if the Qur’an did appear to forbid it, the Sunnah, in their view, is what explains the Qur’an.

Imam al-Shāfiʿī has famous words on this principle, and Imam Aḥmad authored his well-known epistle refuting those who claim that the Qur’an’s outward sense makes one independent of the explanation provided by the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him. In that treatise he marshalled proofs too numerous for this brief space to recount.

Another instance is the rejection of a report that particularises a general Qur’anic text, restricts an unqualified one, or adds a ruling to it. Those who do so maintain that any addition to the text—or the restriction of what is unqualified—amounts to abrogation, and that specifying the general likewise constitutes abrogation.

A further example is the way a group of scholars from Madinah opposed a sound hadith by invoking the practice of the people of Madinah, arguing that those people were unanimous in contradicting the report and that their consensus is a proof that takes precedence over the report itself.