or that negated actions do not negate the acts themselves or every legal consequence attaching to them; or that what an utterance necessarily entails possesses no universality, so he lays no claim to universality with respect to what is implicit or to underlying notions, and so on—subjects upon which one could speak at great length. Indeed, fully half of the disputed questions in the field of legal theory fall under this heading, even though the bare abstract principles do not encompass every contested mode of indication, and they subsume within themselves individual instances of entire classes of indications, leaving the inquiry: Does this particular instance truly belong to that class or not? For example, he may believe that a given expression is ambiguous because it is homonymous, with no contextual clue to determine which of its two meanings is intended, and the like.

Reason Eight:
He believes that the indication in question is countered by evidence showing that it was not intended—such as opposing a general text with a specific one, an absolute text with a qualified one, a bare command with something that negates obligation, or a literal wording with evidence that it is to be taken figuratively, and other forms of contradiction. This, too, is a vast field, for the conflict of verbal indications and the preference of some over others is a boundless, surging sea.