Jimāʿ al-ʿIlmAl-Shafi'i

and in hunting as well.

134 – This shows that no one is allowed to speak on any point of sacred knowledge except by means of ijtihad, and the ijtihad required here is like the effort of searching for the House when determining the qiblah, or of finding the proper equivalent in cases of game.

135 – Ijtihad is open only to someone who knows the proofs that bear on the matter—whether an authoritative report from the Book, the Sunnah, or consensus—and who then pursues the ruling by analogy, reasoning from some of what I have just described, just as one seeks out what is hidden from him of the direction of the House or is uncertain about the equivalent for hunted game.

136 – As for anyone who lacks the necessary tools, it is not lawful for him to say anything about sacred knowledge.

137 – A parallel case is that Allah has stipulated uprightness for witnesses; uprightness consists of obedience and sound judgment for testimony. When these traits are outwardly apparent to us, we accept a person’s testimony on the basis of what is manifest, even though he might be concealing the opposite. We have not been charged with uncovering the unseen, so we are not permitted—while lacking sure knowledge that his inner state matches his outward appearance—to accept the testimony of anyone who turns up if the signs of uprightness are missing. This illustrates the same principle that the previous discussion established.

138 – It therefore makes clear that it is impermissible for anyone to speak on matters of knowledge except in the manner we have described.

139 – He asked, “Can you provide an illustration of this from things that ordinary people recognize?”

140 – I replied, “Yes.”

141 – He said, “What is it?”

142 – I said, “Consider a garment whose defects vary, or a slave, or any other merchandise—when a judge needs to assess its value, to whom does he show it?”

143 – He answered, “He shows it only to those who are knowledgeable about it.”

144 – I said, “That is because their condition differs from that of the ignorant: they know its markets…"

الصيد معا. ١٣٤ - ويدل على أنه لا يجوز لا حد أن يقول في شيء من العلم إلا بالاجتهاد والاجتهاد فيه كالاجتهاد في طلب البيت في القبلة والمثل في الصيد. ١٣٥ - ولا يكون الاجتهاد إلا لمن عرف الدلائل عليه من خبر لازم كتاب أو سنة أو إجماع ثم يطلب ذلك بالقياس عليه بالاستدلال ببعض ما وصفت كما يطلب ما غاب عنه من البيت واشتبه عليه من مثل الصيد. ١٣٦ - فأما من لا آلة فيه فلا يحل له أن يقول في العلم شيئا. ١٣٧ - ومثل هذا أن الله شرط العدل بالشهود والعدل العمل بالطاعة والعقل للشهادة فإذا ظهر لنا هذه قبلنا شهادة الشاهد على الظاهر وقد يمكن أن يكون يستبطن خلافه ولكن لم يكلف المغيب فلم يرخص لنا إذا كنا على غير إحاطة من أن باطنه كظاهره أن نجيز شهادة من جاءنا إذا لم يكن فيه علامات العدل هذا يدل على ما دل عليه ما قبله. ١٣٨ - وبين أن لا يجوز لا حد أن يقول في العلم بغير ما وصفنا. ١٣٩ - قال: أفتوجدنية بدلالة مما يعرف الناس. ١٤٠ - فقلت: نعم. ١٤١ - قال: وما هي؟. ١٤٢ - قلت: أرأيت الثوب يختلف في عيبه والرقيق وغيره من السلع من يريه الحاكم ليقومه؟. ١٤٣ - قال: لا يريه إلا أهل العلم به. ١٤٤- قلت: لأن حالهم مخالفة حال أهل الجهالة آن يعرفوا أسوا قه

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