and, within them as well, there is the mardūd (rejected); it is the report whose transmitter’s truthfulness has not become the stronger probability (1)—because one cannot adduce it as proof until the states of its narrators are examined, unlike the first category, the mutawātir, every one of which is accepted since it yields certainty regarding the veracity of its reporters, a status not shared by the other āḥād reports.

Nonetheless, only the accepted among those reports must be acted upon (2), for each narration will either contain the fundamental mark of acceptance—that is, established honesty on the part of the transmitter—or the fundamental mark of rejection—established lying on the part of the transmitter—or neither.

In the first case, the likelihood (3) that the report is true (4) predominates, owing to the confirmed honesty (5) of its transmitter, and so it is taken as evidence.

In the second case, the likelihood (6) of the report’s falsehood predominates because its transmitter is proven to be a liar, and thus it is discarded.

In the third case, if there exists an additional indicator (7) that affiliates it with either of the two preceding categories, it is treated accordingly,