—while bracketing off any consideration of validity, whether by affirming it or denying it—and this opinion is weak.

The second opinion is that the wording is all-embracing: it covers the negation of the act itself, the negation of its legal ruling, and the negation of its quality. Once reason rules out the possibility that the act itself is being denied, the remaining two kinds of negation stand. This is the view Abu al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī reports from the majority of jurists. It rests on the premise that the negation is directed not at the act as defined by Sacred Law but at the act in its linguistic sense. Ascribing this view to most jurists, however, is open to objection, for the majority acknowledge the technical legal usage.

The third opinion holds that the phrase refers to the legal act, yet it is general, encompassing the negation of the act itself, its validity, and its perfection.

The fourth opinion maintains that the apparent sense is to negate validity; it is not taken to negate perfection unless there is specific evidence. This is the position adopted by most of the leading investigators among our Ḥanbalī scholars and among the Shāfiʿīs, and it is the view indicated by Aḥmad’s words in the majority of the reports from him.

The fifth opinion is that when a legal act is negated on account of some matter connected with it, that negation indicates the obligation of that particular matter; for an act may only be denied because a mandatory element of it is missing, not because a recommended element has been left out. If the latter were permissible, one could declare the prayer of most Muslims non-existent.