may constitute shirk. It is evident that an adherent to the Sunnah would then have no grounds for declaring anything done by healers to be a religious innovation, for they would say, “This has been tried and found beneficial, and the governing principle is empirical testing.” You must therefore either close this door and maintain that one must stop at the limits of what has been transmitted, or else there will never be such a thing as a religious innovation. If something is prohibited, it will merely be deemed prohibited, not an innovation. Even if the only basis for prohibition were the principle of blocking the means to wrongdoing, that would be sufficient and authoritative, as it falls under one of the established principles of Islamic law.

• The fourth argument is that a prohibition of ruqyahs has been authentically reported, and some ruqyahs may constitute shirk—we seek refuge in Allah—as stated in the hadith of Abd Allah ibn Masūd, may Allah be pleased with him: “Ruqyahs, amulets, and love-charms are shirk.” (1) The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, subsequently permitted ruqyahs. This either means that the prohibition was abrogated by the permission, or that the general prohibition was qualified by exempting ruqyahs free of shirk. It may also be said that when it is unclear whether something is prohibited or permitted, precedence should be given to prohibition in order to safeguard the religion. Ruqyahs whose approval by revealed law is not known should therefore be prohibited. Accordingly, the hadith, “There is no harm in ruqyahs so long as they involve no shirk,” does not indicate unrestricted permissibility. Rather, it refers to what was prescribed in the Sunnah or approved by the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, as in the hadith: “Teach her the ruqyah for namlah.” This implicitly indicates that the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, knew what that ruqyah contained. The other hadiths expressing general permission likewise employ general formulations intended to refer only to particular cases; unrestricted generality was not intended. Indeed, the permission did not encompass every ruqyah, as shown by the fact that ruqyahs containing shirk were excluded, whereas those containing some other prohibited element were not expressly excluded.

As for the response to the evidence cited by those who permit independent judgment and empirical testing, the texts they mention are far narrower than this sweeping claim. His words, “Whoever is able to benefit his brother,” were uttered after he had approved the ruqyah for scorpion sting: “Whoever is able to benefit his brother through it should do so.” The same applies to the ruqyahs for snakebite and namlah. Indeed, the meaning of the statement that he “granted such-and-such clan permission to perform ruqyah for snakebite” is plainly that this ruqyah had no standing without his approval of their use of it. It does not contain the broad generalization that might immediately be inferred.

• The fifth argument is that such practices include things whose nature is unknown. They are neither of the same kind as those established by revealed texts nor natural remedies. There is consensus that unknown practices are to be prohibited in the field of ruqyah.