the cessation of motion, whereupon he declared: “The motions of the people of Paradise and of the Fire will come to an end, so that they remain in perpetual stillness, none of them able to move.”⦗1⦘
A group who agreed with them on the impossibility of an infinite succession of events—among them Abū al-Ḥasan ibn al-Zāghawānī⦗2⦘—claimed that this conclusion is required by pure rational inference. Yet, because revelation affirms the everlastingness of Paradise and Hell, they said that they nevertheless accepted it⦗3⦘, unaware that whatever reason judges impossible can never be confirmed by revelation, for revelation does not report the occurrence of what the intellect deems impossible⦗4⦘.
The majority who sided with Jahm and Abū al-Hudhayl on their basic premise drew a rational distinction between the past and the future, arguing that the past has already entered existence, whereas the future has not; what is impossible, they said, is that something infinite should come into existence.
The discussion of these views has been expanded elsewhere⦗5⦘, where the errors of their proponents are exposed. It is clarified there that when the past is described as infinite, the meaning is only that it has no beginning—thus it does not terminate at an initial point. If, however, one imagines a past that is being reversed and exhausted, then it is in fact finite.