for colour to turn into sound. Those who maintain that sound can sometimes be seen must be asked, “What is sight?” They must answer, “It is a faculty by which visible things—colours and other things—are perceived.” Then they should be asked, “What is hearing?” They must answer, “It is a faculty by which sounds are perceived.”

Once they have posited this, they should be asked, “When sight perceives sounds, is it sight alone or hearing alone?” If they say it is hearing alone, they have conceded that it does not perceive colours. If they say it is sight alone, then it does not perceive sounds. Since it is neither sight alone, because it perceives sounds, nor hearing alone, because it perceives colours, it must be both sight and hearing. On this basis, all things would be one and the same, even opposites.

This, I believe, is something the speculative theologians of our religious community concede, or are bound to concede—I mean these Ash'arīs. It is a sophistical view held by certain ancient thinkers well known for sophistry.