Hāmid and Ibn al-Khatīb, among others, upon reflecting on this, reverted on the question of vision to the position of the Muʿtazilah, or something close to it. They interpreted it as an increase in knowledge, just as the Jahmiyyah, the Muʿtazilah, and others do. In reality, this amounts to denying the vision established by the scriptural texts and consensus, whose possibility is known through rational proofs. Indeed, rational proofs establish that it is impossible for a self-subsisting being to exist that cannot be seen.

Yet these affirmers, who agree with the believers at large that He can be seen, but stand apart from the community in claiming that He is seen neither above the beholder, nor to his right, nor to his left, nor in any direction relative to him, have agreed with those Jahmiyyah that a being of this description exists. Their agreement with them that such a being can exist is further removed from revelation and reason than their claim that this being can be seen. This is why innate human dispositions reject its existence more strongly than they reject its being seen, assuming it exists. As we have already explained, their statement, “He is above the Throne but is not a body,” is more tenable than their statement, “He is neither within the world nor outside it.”