things whose impossibility is self-evident to reason. Indeed, they say that it is self-evident to reason that only something that occupies space, or subsists in something that occupies space, can be seen. Whoever claims that something which neither occupies space nor subsists in something occupying space can be seen has departed from the necessary truths of reason. This is agreed upon by rational people of every persuasion, except this group, whose inconsistency people unanimously acknowledge.

For even those among the Jahmī philosophers, the Muʿtazilah, and the like who agree with them that something can exist which neither occupies space nor inheres in anything occupying space, and that this can be known through reason—although the majority of rational people regard them as contradicting a necessary truth of reason—do not agree with them that such a being can be seen. Rather, they agree with the majority of rational people that what neither occupies space nor inheres in something occupying space cannot be seen. So much so that even the leading later followers of al-Ashʿarī, such as Abū