every respect, just as He has the characteristics of what is impossible in this respect.”

They are also asked: “Is it not the case that what has no actual existence in a human being is described as neither in contact with nor separate from a place?” If they say yes, they are asked: “Then tell us about the One you worship: is He in contact with or separate from a place?” If they say, “He is described by neither,” they are told: “Then the description by which you affirm the Creator’s existence is like the description of a created being’s nonexistence. Why, then, do you not say that He is nonexistent, just as you say that a human being is nonexistent when you describe him in terms of nonexistence?”

They are also told: “If what constitutes nonexistence for a created being constitutes existence for Him, then what constitutes ignorance for a created being constitutes knowledge for Him. For you have described as existence for Him what constitutes nonexistence for a created being. Thus, if nonexistence is existence, ignorance is knowledge and incapacity is power.”’”

In this passage, he has explained why it is impossible to say of the Creator, “He is neither in contact with nor separate from a place,” thereby denying Him two contradictory attributes, both of which cannot be absent from an existing being, as is known by clear reason. These two attributes, and others like them, are mutually exclusive both in affirmation and in negation.

He presented three arguments for this.

The first is that the absence of both these attributes in a human being is impossible and inconceivable. If it were permissible to describe Him by this impossibility, it would be permissible to describe Him by other impossibilities.

I say: This argument from their own premises is like saying: “Neither knowing nor ignorant,