inconsistent.

The seventh point is that the same reasoning by which we know that every externally existing thing must have an attribute and a distinctive property that set it apart and distinguish it from everything else also establishes that every existent must have a limit and a magnitude that set it apart from everything else. Every existent must have an attribute peculiar to it and a measure peculiar to it.

By “limit” (hadd) here, we do not mean the definition of a kind, for that is a verbal formulation indicating what is defined. It is universal: conceiving its meaning does not preclude its being shared by multiple things. If, however, by a definition one means the defined thing itself and its reality, then nothing defined exists externally as a universal qua universal. Rather, one says, “The reality of this resembles the reality of that.” Thus, limits resemble and match one another when what is meant by them is the realities of externally existing things. Every existent must have these limits and realities, as we have mentioned. And to posit a self-subsisting existent that has no attribute