not finite. In his view, then, it admits neither description, just as it admits neither co-location nor separation, neither being inside nor being outside, and the like. Being devoid of both descriptions presupposes that this is possible or actually the case; it therefore cannot serve as evidence for what entails its existence. A thing cannot serve as evidence for itself when it is itself what must be established by evidence. How, then, can a claim of possibility and actuality prove a thing’s existence before its existence is known?

Furthermore, regarding his statement, “Imaginings cannot reach Him, nor can thoughts range over Him”: if he means that they cannot encompass or comprehend Him, this is true. But if he means that they cannot establish or acknowledge His existence, this is false.

Moreover, being without limit and beyond the reach of imaginings and thoughts does not invalidate the classification, as when we say that an existent is either self-subsisting or subsists in another, and is either Creator or created. He had already said at the outset, concerning the categories of existents: “They fall into two categories: that whose existence has no beginning, namely the Eternal One (glory be to Him)