those who affirm the divine attributes said that what prevents this is spatial occupation, which necessitates this impossibility and spatial occupation. On this account, the judgment must cease to apply when its cause is absent. Thus, whatever does not occupy space cannot prevent what we have described.

Some said that this is necessitated by the mutual opposition between their two states of being. On this account, whatever has no such state of being does not stand in opposition to anything else. Such states of being belong only to bodies, by their common agreement, and this is evident.

Others said that this impossibility admits of no causal explanation—that is, it is intrinsic to the entity itself. On this account, what is known is that this applies to entities that occupy space; this impossibility cannot be conceived with respect to something that does not occupy space.

On every account, therefore, something that does not occupy space, if it subsists in itself, would necessarily not prevent anything else from interpenetrating it. Yet this is certainly false. Since minds know necessarily that what subsists in itself prevents anything else from interpenetrating it, and since this judgment applies exclusively to what occupies space, it follows that they recognize nothing as subsisting in itself except what occupies space.

The sixth argument: The reasoning by which it is known that a contingent and temporally originated existent can only be a body or an accident; or can only be a substance, a body, or an accident; or can only occupy space or