do not hold this view and acknowledge that He is not absolute existence, but has a reality peculiar to Him that distinguishes Him from all others. The point, however, is that just as he and those like him know through clear reason that the position of these advocates of negation is false, those who affirm know through clear reason that He cannot be a particular, distinct existent subsisting in Himself while being neither within the world nor outside it, and, in their terminology, neither a body nor an accident, neither a body nor something occupying space. Likewise, they know that it is impossible to say that He neither subsists in Himself nor subsists in another. For if you ask them to explain what they mean by occupying space and by a body, they explain these in terms known to describe that which subsists in itself. Hence, no one can conceive of anything subsisting in itself except what they call something occupying space and a body. Thus, their claim that there exists something that neither occupies space nor is a body, nor subsists in something occupying space or in a body, is like their claim that there exists something that neither subsists in itself nor subsists in another.

This becomes clear through the fourth argument: they do not dispute that an existent is either something subsisting in itself, although they dispute describing anything other than Him as subsisting in itself