one of them had perceived, they would not have been silenced by such an argument. Its utmost achievement was to establish the existence of something imperceptible to the senses and draw an analogy between it and the Lord. Had they accepted no form of rational analogy, they would not have entertained such reasoning, nor could they have been addressed through it—just as the prophets’ statements cannot be used as evidence that they are lying.

Nor can it be said, “He established his case against them by demonstrating the existence of something imperceptible to the senses and then reasoning by analogy with it.” The response would be that, had their fundamental principle been to reject analogy concerning perceptible things, they would likewise have rejected it concerning the imperceptible thing whose existence they had been compelled to acknowledge. They would have said, “The existence of this is known, as you have explained; but why must we acknowledge something analogous to it?” This would follow if their fundamental principle were that a thing’s status could [not] be known by analogy with its counterpart.

Rather, what should be said is that these people maintained that nothing exists unless it can be perceived by the senses, and that a person therefore does not believe in the existence of anything that cannot be known through any of the senses. They were not saying that a particular individual knows only what he himself has perceived, going so far as to deny what everyone tells him about things resembling those he has perceived, and also to deny the existence of anything analogous to what he has perceived—or to be incapable of acknowledging it. It is inconceivable that a community living in society would say such a thing. The speculative theologians have mentioned this, saying that a group whose numbers reach