by necessity and through our innate disposition that any two existent beings that are living, knowing, and powerful—indeed, any two existent beings whatsoever—share in what is meant by existence and established being, even though each is distinguished from the other by its own particular characteristic, whether it is a necessary existent or not. What they share is neither what distinguishes them nor something that necessarily entails it. Otherwise, one would be identical to the other, if the shared feature necessarily entailed the distinguishing feature. For if neither possessed a distinguishing feature unique to itself, but wherever the shared feature existed, the distinguishing feature also existed—and the shared feature belongs to both—then the distinguishing feature would belong to both, leaving neither with any distinction of its own. Thus, one would not be different from the other, since two particular entities must be distinguished from one another by something peculiar to each.

If, then, each is characterized by a common feature—and having a common feature means that one bears some resemblance to the other, even if only in certain respects—it is impossible for there to be an existent that shares nothing with other existents in any aspect of existence and bears no resemblance to them in any such respect. This is why the early generations and the leading imams used to say that scholars know through reason that such a thing cannot exist, as Imam Ahmad, may Allah have mercy on him, said in his refutation