rationally intelligible and known, just as one sets aside the notions advanced by the Jahmiyyah and other proponents of heresy, which they call rational truths although they are manifestations of ignorance.
Sixth, his opponent may concede that conception and imagination should be set aside in knowing Allah’s acts, attributes, and essence. Yet he has not set aside the innate human disposition and necessary knowledge, and our question belongs to this category. He has not presented a single argument disproving that this is known by necessity, nor can an argument be accepted against what is known by necessity.
Seventh, he has only established that Allah’s acts and attributes are not like our acts and attributes. This does not entail that they exist in a manner contrary to conception and imagination, for conception and imagination do not deny something merely because they contain no likeness of it. At most, what he has mentioned establishes the absence of a counterpart in existence. Conception and imagination do not deny what has no counterpart. Rather, they are among the strongest means of affirming what has no counterpart, through the things they posit and portray, which exist within them but have no counterpart in external reality.
As for his statement, “These ten proofs show that His transcendence of spatial location and direction is not something that sound reason rejects, and that completes