and his opponent says: “I know that there is no existent that is neither within the world nor outside it.” He does not say: “I am incapable of knowing that it exists.”

Second, the limitations of conception and imagination do not entail limitations in knowledge, reason, and sensory perception. His opponent says that this cannot be known through reason or anything else. If something else is rationally intelligible, it does not follow that this must be rationally intelligible.

Third, his opponent says: “I know, through the fully sound innate human disposition, that such an existent is impossible.” He does not say: “We believe this through our conception and imagination rather than through our knowledge and reason.”

Fourth, all that he has mentioned merely establishes the existence of something without parallel; it does not establish the existence of what we believe does not exist. The former is conceded, whereas the point at issue belongs to the latter category.

Fifth, conception and imagination that correspond to reality, knowledge, reason, and sensory perception are all on an equal footing in the matters he has mentioned, as explained earlier. Moreover, he has not set aside knowledge and reason in knowing Allah—exalted be He—so neither should sound sensory perception and sound imagination be set aside. As for what is unsound, it is to be set aside, even if it is said to be