is not denied by sense perception or reason; how much less, then, the existence of something that likewise has no equal counterpart? Reason, sense perception, imagination, and conception are all on the same footing in this respect. His statement, “It is well known that human conception and imagination are incapable of acknowledging this existent being,” is therefore equivalent to saying, “Human reason and knowledge are incapable of acknowledging this existent being.” Yet he does not say that Allah exists contrary to the judgment of reason and knowledge. He must therefore take the same position regarding sense perception, conception, and imagination.

Furthermore, if by saying “contrary to that” he means that conception and imagination are incapable of comprehending this, that does no harm to the argument. An inability to comprehend something in some respects does not preclude the ability to know it in another respect. If, however, he means that conception and imagination apprehend something incompatible with it, that is incorrect: nothing in our sound conception or imagination is incompatible with it. Even if a false belief incompatible with it is assumed, it is like a belief whose holder supposes it to be rational or known. We have already explained that the terms “conception” and “imagination” are sometimes applied to what is false and sometimes to what corresponds to reality. What corresponds to reality is not incompatible with it, while what is false is not in dispute.

Furthermore, the conviction that it is impossible for a being to exist neither within the world nor outside it