the judgment of reason and knowledge.

Third, this means that Allah is not like us, nor are His attributes equal in measure to ours. It has already been explained that the absence of anything like a thing does not entail that thing’s nonexistence. How much more so when only His likeness to us has been denied—even though nothing whatsoever is like Allah Most High. We have already explained that if establishing this contrary to sensory perception and imagination means that it has no counterpart, then this is true. However, that there can be no being neither inside nor outside the world is known through the self-evident dictates of the innate disposition, not through analogy or the absence of a counterpart.

Fourth, we hold no belief, grounded in either sensory perception or reason, that negates this power. This is unlike the existence of a being neither inside nor outside the world, for we possess both necessary and inferential knowledge that negates this.

Fifth, human beings differ in their intellectual capacities. If one person’s inability to do what another can does not prevent belief that the latter possesses that ability, even though they belong to the same species, then a person’s inability should all the more certainly not prevent belief in the power of his Creator.

Sixth, if one of them knows that another possesses an ability to act which he himself lacks, without finding this impossible either in sensory perception or in