and imagination? At most, this establishes that His knowledge is unlike what we conceive and imagine within ourselves, and there is no doubt about this.

This becomes clear from the second response: Allah, glorified is He, is unlike what we know, apprehend intellectually, and perceive through the senses in ourselves, let alone what we imagine and conceive within ourselves. Thus, this is not peculiar to mental conception and imagination. If Allah, glorified is He, is unlike what we perceive, know, apprehend intellectually, and imagine within ourselves, yet this does not entail that He is incompatible with what we know, then neither must He be incompatible with what we perceive through the senses.

The third response further establishes this: knowing that it is impossible for something to exist neither inside the world nor outside it is innate, necessary knowledge, not something peculiar to mental conception and imagination. As for what he has mentioned concerning the all-encompassing knowledge of Allah Most High, we hold no belief that in any way negates it.

Fourth: nothing in the description of Allah’s knowledge is negated by any belief we hold, whether grounded in sense perception, mental conception, imagination, or reason—unless it is a false belief unsupported by either necessary knowledge or reasoning. There is no doubt that Allah’s essence and attributes are contrary to false beliefs thought to be apprehended by reason, perceived through the senses, or imagined. In this respect, however, there is no difference between what is thought to be rationally apprehended and known, and what is thought to be perceived through the senses and imagined.