and their accidents after their nonexistence.

The second answer to the first interpretation is that, even if we concede that our conception and imagination deem this impossible, this poses no difficulty if we know through reason and sense perception that it is possible. No one has said that everything deemed impossible by mere conception and imagination must be impossible. Rather, this has been said only of what the innate human disposition and immediate intuition deem impossible. The distinction between the two has already been explained.

As for the two answers to the second interpretation—that conception and imagination do not know this to be possible—the first is that we do not concede that they do not know it to be possible. A person can imagine things whose existence after nonexistence he has perceived through his senses. Through imagination, he combines these into things he has not previously imagined, as imagination normally does. He thus imagines their counterparts, as well as combinations of them that have no counterpart, such as a mountain of ruby or a sea of mercury. Thus he imagines, among