and all other things. For when a person perceives or imagines something, this gives rise to knowledge and rational understanding that sense perception and imagination do not themselves apprehend. Thus, upon perceiving particular instances, one grasps general, universal concepts through analogy and comparison. Yet one cannot say of all objects of rational understanding that they are affirmed contrary to the judgment of sense perception and imagination. If someone intends this meaning by that expression, there is no harm in it, since it would mean that a person acquires through reason knowledge that he does not acquire through his senses. This is undisputed. It does not, however, imply any incompatibility between what is perceived by the senses and what is understood by reason; rather, it entails their mutual confirmation and agreement.

Second, sense perception can apprehend everything that exists. There is nothing that can be apprehended that cannot be known through inward or outward sense perception, as we have already pointed out earlier in these responses. Indeed, this opponent and his associates have made some of the strongest statements to this effect in discussing vision and other matters, maintaining that everything that exists can be seen. Indeed,