what is known not to exist and what is known to have no likeness, just as we explained the difference between what is known not to exist and what is not known to exist or whose manner of being is unknown. This principle should be clearly understood and kept in mind, for confusion over it leads to a mingling of truth with falsehood to an extent known to Allah.

Moreover, sense perception and imagination have no unique status when it comes to affirming things contrary to their judgment. If he means that His acts contradict what is known through sense perception and imagination—that these conflict with knowledge of His acts because sense perception and imagination apprehend their nonexistence—then this is false. But if he means that among His acts one affirms things for which no counterpart is known, or whose reality cannot be fully comprehended through sense perception or imagination, then the reply is: Nor is any counterpart known through reason, knowledge, or analogy. In this respect, therefore, there is no difference between affirming them contrary to the judgment of sense perception and imagination and affirming them contrary to the judgment of knowledge and reason.

This observation, too, is useful in such discussions. No one may distinguish between the two by arguing that knowledge and reason apprehend aspects of His acts that sense perception and imagination do not, for two reasons. First, in this respect there is no difference between Allah’s acts and attributes