and we have already explained that His acting by choice is established by the evidence for a will that selects one effect rather than another, by the evidence for the intended wisdom in what He brings into being, and by both together. Yet these philosophers followed one of the two approaches and contradicted themselves in disputing the other. The Ash‘arīs followed one approach and disputed the other, and they too are necessarily guilty of inconsistency. Both approaches establish the same conclusion: that He acts with intent, will, and choice. This approach followed by Abū al-Ma‘ālī, al-Rāzī, and others is also sound and yields certain knowledge that He acts with will and choice.

Ibn Rushd said: “He then explained”—meaning Abū al-Ma‘ālī—“that what is contingent proceeds from will, that is, from an agent endowed with will, because every act proceeds either from nature or from will. Nature does not produce just one of two like contingent things; I mean that it does not produce one thing rather than another like it, but produces both. For example, scammony does not