premise through several further premises: first, that whatever is contingent must have a determining agent that gives one of its two possible attributes precedence over the other; second, that this determining agent can only be endowed with will; and third, that whatever owes its existence to will has a beginning.”

I say: Al-Rāzī likewise formulated it in this way. Such are the three premises. Yet Ibn Rushd’s and the philosophers’ disagreement concerning those two premises does not undermine the argument. We have already shown that they agree that the Creator acts with will and intent, as became clear in their affirmation of providence. Even if they contradict themselves by denying will here, this avails them nothing, given their own admission of it. Moreover, we have shown that the evidence establishing this is certain and self-evident, and that denying it is like denying the Necessary Existent.

However, Abū al-Ma‘ālī, al-Rāzī, and others like them needed this approach only because they do not affirm wisdom directed toward an end; they affirm only a will that specifies one possibility rather than another.