to others, while the order of the world remains intact. Change from one state to another does occur in the world. If, then, the qualities and dimensions that exist served an end whose existence was necessary—that is, whose absence was impossible, since otherwise universal disorder would ensue—this would not be the case.

The fourth response is to say: When you describe something as necessarily existent in relation to causes and wise purposes, what do you mean? Do you mean that it is necessary in itself, such that its nonexistence is impossible? Or do you mean that, if it were absent, the wise purpose for which it existed would also be absent? The first is certainly false, and he did not intend it. As for the second, we say to you: Grant that its absence would entail the absence of that particular wise purpose. That particular wise purpose is not itself necessary; rather, it too is contingent. Its being singled out by will rather than other wise purposes must therefore involve a determining factor, namely will. Indeed, that wise purpose can only be a wise purpose if it is intended. You yourself affirm this and argue on its basis. Thus, what you deemed necessary indicates, with even greater force, the will that determines particulars.

The fifth response is to say: These things change from one state to another, and their movements and transformations are either necessary in themselves