as with causes. Moreover, it may be argued that this perceptible existent entails the existence of the eternal Necessary Existent. For every existent is either eternal and necessary in itself, or contingent, or something that has come into being. Whatever is contingent or has come into being entails the existence of the eternal Necessary Existent. Thus, the existence of that which is necessary in itself is established.

Likewise, it may be argued that these perceptible ends entail the existence of an end sought for its own sake. For these ends are sought either for their own sake or for the sake of something else, and whatever is sought for the sake of something else entails the existence of something sought for its own sake. Thus, on either supposition, there must be something sought for its own sake, just as, on either supposition, there must be something that exists in itself. This, in turn, demonstrates the existence of a willing, intending agent who acts for the sake of these ends, whether they are sought for the sake of something else or for their own sake.

Once this is established, the philosophers’ inconsistency and the unsoundness of their position become clear in the argument from