among them are the metaphysicians. Their acknowledgment that this harmony necessarily proceeds from an agent who intends and wills it has already been mentioned. Undoubtedly, this acknowledgment is necessarily known, just as it is necessarily known that whatever comes into being must have an originator, and that whatever is contingent must have a determining cause.

In the former case, there are two premises: first, that there are observable things that come into being; and second, that whatever comes into being must have an originator. The first rests on sensory perception, while the second is rational, self-evident, and necessarily known. Likewise, there are contingent things, and whatever is contingent must have a necessary determining cause.

Similarly, here there are two premises: first, that there are wise purposes and desired benefits; and second, that these must have an agent who intends and wills them. Both premises are necessarily known: the first through sensory perception and the second through reason. For perceiving benefit is like perceiving things coming into being, although some details of this are known through inference or reports. Moreover, these wise purposes may be known to have come into being, and they may be known to be contingent.