The point is that, if you appeal to their agreement with you in applying the name, then if you are appealing to agreement about its meaning, you have no proof. They all agree that, as they understand it, this name does not negate what you negate, such as His will and other attributes. If, however, you appeal merely to agreement on the wording while its meaning remains disputed, this is a thoroughly invalid argument. They applied the name with certain meanings in mind, whereas you claim that they ought to have intended other meanings by it.

This is like saying that they ought to have meant such-and-such by the word “beneficence,” or such-and-such by “motion” and “action,” or other meanings they did not intend by those words. In short, this is an objection to language on the grounds that its words ought to convey other meanings. Such an objection to language is undoubtedly invalid, let alone a proof in rational matters concerning the divine.

Fourth:

Suppose it is conceded to you that the term ought to have been used in the meanings you mentioned. Nevertheless, if they used it only in the meanings they intended, they were not agreeing with you on the meaning you claimed, even if their wording was inadequate. Thus, the meaning you affirm has been affirmed without any proof, whether demonstrative or dialectical, but merely by assertion. This is plain