so they deprived him of it all without bringing him any benefit.

Or like someone who says:
“I do not pray because, when I pray, I fall short in the remembrance of Allah, worship, and obedience that I ought to observe during prayer. So I abandon prayer altogether for fear of neglecting some of its obligations.”

Likewise, someone who says:
“I pay no zakat at all because, if I pay it, someone who is not entitled to it may take the zakat on part of my wealth, depriving its rightful recipients. So I deprive the rightful recipients of all the zakat, lest they be deprived of some of it by competing claimants.”

Or like someone who commits forbidden acts of sexual immorality and forsakes lawful marriage, saying:
“For if I marry a woman, I may have intercourse with her while she is menstruating, or have anal intercourse with her.” Thus, for fear of this sin, he deems sodomy and other acts of sexual immorality lawful.

Or someone who takes to stealing people’s wealth for fear of engaging in trade or a craft in which the wrong he might commit would be less than the wrong of theft.

Or someone who remains in lands at war with the Muslims, helping their inhabitants fight the Muslims, for fear that, if he migrates to Muslim lands, he may fall short in jihad against those at war with them. There are very many such examples.

It is remarkable that, when these people and other unbelievers like them raise an objection of this kind, the speculative theologians who debate them should