The tenth point: Suppose that we affirm nothing with certainty, but merely judge it more likely that one meaning rather than the other is intended. If we say that this meaning is more likely to be intended, and believe it probable that this is what is intended—as with many verses and hadiths whose interpretation people dispute, where one view is judged more likely than the others—why should this not be permissible? What prevents it? This is not reliance on conjecture in a rational matter requiring certainty, but in a scriptural matter that is not definitive. The premise is that this interpretation does not contradict any definitive evidence: reason allows either meaning to be intended, while revelation lends one of them greater probability. Why, then, should such a judgment of relative likelihood not be permissible? This is the apparent meaning, which is one of the senses you assign to the term muhkam (clear).

The eleventh point: Some people say that, in fundamental matters, one may rely only on evidence yielding certainty, not conjecture. This admits of two cases. If the matter is one in which we are commanded to have certainty—such as certainty concerning Allah’s oneness, belief in the Messenger, and belief in the Last Day—then it can only be established through evidence yielding certainty. As for matters in which we are not required to