Allah Most High has revealed of the Book, or in the messengers He has sent.

The ninth point: You say that scriptural evidence is not to be set aside in favor of stronger evidence, because weighing the evidence yields only conjecture, and conjecture cannot be relied upon in rational matters requiring certainty.

The answer is: There is a distinction between holding a probable belief and believing that one alternative is more probable than another. You yourself have mentioned this distinction, as have Abū al-Husayn al-Basrī and others. Believing that one alternative is more probable may constitute certain knowledge. Thus, if someone believes that one apparent meaning is more likely than another, that relative likelihood can itself be known with certainty. Moreover, one must act upon the more probable interpretation, thereby acting on knowledge rather than conjecture.

Accordingly, when two apparent meanings conflict and one is known to be more likely, we affirm with certainty that Allah is more likely to intend that meaning. This certainty constitutes knowledge. Why, then, should this not be permissible, even if we do not affirm with certainty that what is intended actually exists? Such certainty is of immense benefit.