admits two meanings equally.

The seventh argument: The possibility of two meanings must relate either to what the speaker means and intends or to the listener’s understanding and conception. The former is invalid, for when a speaker intends a particular meaning by an expression, that meaning and another cannot be equally possible from his standpoint. Indeed, from his standpoint, the expression admits only what he meant and intended by it, and nothing else. If, however, this possibility relates to the listener, it may arise from his limitations, incapacity, and deficient understanding of the expression. But if the expression is accompanied by something indicating the speaker’s intent, then the speaker’s words do not admit two meanings, whether equally or with one more likely than the other.

This being so, such uncertainty is possible—indeed, it occurs—with all expressions. With any utterance, the listener may, owing to his limitations, fail to understand the intended meaning; instead, he may regard that meaning and another as equally possible, or consider one more likely. Accordingly, its classification as unequivocal