whatever conflicts with conclusive rational evidence, whereas whatever does not conflict with conclusive rational evidence is clear. He also says, “An expression may not be diverted from its apparent meaning to its less likely meaning unless conclusive evidence establishes that its apparent meaning is impossible and inconceivable.”

If that is so, whatever conflicts with rational evidence must be interpreted figuratively, even if it is called unequivocal or apparent. This is especially so since he maintains that no verbal evidence is conclusive; thus, for him, there are no unequivocal expressions. Such an expression would therefore be ambiguous in his view, belonging to the interpreted category. Whatever does not conflict with rational evidence, however, is clear and must be either unequivocal or apparent.

An indeterminate expression that admits two meanings equally does not indicate either one specifically. It is therefore inconceivable that reason should conflict with it, which would make it clear; yet here he has classified it as ambiguous. As for the less likely interpretation, unless conclusive rational evidence supports it, the expression may not be construed in that sense—even if it conflicts with stronger scriptural evidence, while itself remaining less likely.

The apparent conclusion is the opposite of what he stated there: there are neither unequivocal nor indeterminate expressions, but only apparent or interpreted ones. This contradicts his division into