And this is the explanation known to scholars, which is more specific than the explanation the Arabs know from their own language. Those knowledgeable about the ta’wīl of commands, prohibitions, and what is lawful and unlawful are like someone who knows precisely what is commanded, prohibited, or forbidden. Hence they issue legal opinions and judgments concerning particular cases: they know, for example, that this direction is the direction of the Kaaba, that this garment may or may not be worn, and that this place is the designated point for entering the state of ihrām. This is comparable to a physician’s knowledge of particular diseases and medicines.

It is also comparable to a plot of land whose boundaries have been specified, a person identified by name, and similar cases. Witnesses may testify to someone’s acknowledgment or to another witness’s testimony, and they testify only to what they know, yet they may not know the actual individual or thing named and described. Those who know what those boundary descriptions refer to, however, know the actual plot of land, just as they know the actual person named so-and-so, son of so-and-so.

When a witness sees and identifies the subject of his testimony in person, this is comparable to ta’wīl. This differs from testifying about someone named and described without identifying the particular individual. Although the witness’s words are understood, they do not identify that individual, since someone other than the subject of the testimony may bear the same name.

Thus, most people have some knowledge of the explanation of the Quran and understand the meaning of oaths of marital abstinence, zihār, mutʿah, divorce in return for compensation, and similar matters. Indeed, a person may even know the scholars’ views concerning them, yet refrain from identifying the particular cases to which they apply, for fear of error.