it is neither known nor thought that the speaker intended it. Indeed, it may be known with certainty that he did not intend it. Hence they say that if the Companions differed between two opinions, those who came after them may introduce a third interpretation. In matters of legal rulings, however, they do not permit a third opinion to be introduced when the Companions differed between two opinions, because the community’s agreement upon two opinions constitutes a consensus that anything beyond them is invalid.

Yet precisely the same objection applies to interpretation. If one group says that a verse means one thing, and another group says that it means something else, whoever says that its meaning is neither of these but a third has contradicted their consensus and declared both groups mistaken.

If it is said, “These people do not say that this was intended; rather, they say that it may have been intended,” the reply is: the Companions did not speak merely in terms of possibilities and what might be admissible. Even supposing that they did, if one of their two possible interpretations was intended, then there was no consensus upon error. But if the intended meaning was the third possibility introduced after them, then neither group included anyone who knew what Allah Most High intended. Rather, both groups considered it possible that He intended something other than what He actually intended, while neither entertained what He did intend. This is among the gravest forms of misguidance.

As for the fifth argument, which he deemed the strongest reason, namely,