rational proofs, so that the truth would be known through reason. Yet this plainly contradicts the descriptions given of it. Moreover, on the assumption these people make, it would have been better for creation if the Quran had not been revealed and the Messenger had not been sent. For guidance came to them solely through reason, without their needing the Scripture or the Messenger. Yet, in their view, the Scripture and the Messenger conflicted with this reason. Hence they said that reason must take precedence, while what the Messenger brought must either be disregarded or assigned interpretations by which it can be construed. In either case, the Scripture and the Messenger provided neither clarification, guidance, nor knowledge; rather, in their view, they caused the opposite. For them, knowledge of the fundamentals of religion and of divine oneness came only through rational conclusions contrary to what the Messenger brought—conclusions that he neither indicated nor guided people to. This utterly contradicts the verses they cited as evidence.

The same applies to the fourth argument: interpretation requires acquiring many branches of knowledge. Guidance was thus not attained through the Quran; rather, these disciplines were used to devise interpretations for it, lest people be led astray by it. In interpreting a speaker’s words, these people do not seek to discover his intended meaning. Rather, they seek to identify whatever meaning the wording can possibly bear, so that it may be construed accordingly, even if