and that what is denoted by “body” is simply that which subsists in itself, that which has magnitude, or an attribute of that which has magnitude. The meaning, then, is that things which subsist in themselves do not, by virtue of their magnitude, prevent attributes from inhering in them, since there is no incompatibility between magnitude and an attribute. This is true. Incompatibility may, however, arise from the particular nature of that which possesses magnitude. Likewise, an accident, insofar as it is an accident, does not preclude coexistence with another accident, as when color, taste, and smell coexist in a single substrate. Incompatibility arises only between certain accidents, such as two colors or two tastes.

Thus, there is in fact no difference between incompatibility among bodies and incompatibility between a body and an accident. Incompatibility and contrariety apply only to some instances within these three categories, not to others, depending on the particular nature of the two contrary things. In short, terms such as “impediment,” “incompatibility,” and “contrariety” have a broader meaning in the language people use to communicate than in the technical usage of these thinkers. Moreover, they frequently err in their judgments concerning bodies