and remote in preference to what is nearer. An example is the dispute over whether the absence of perception—namely, seeing and hearing—necessarily entails the existence of its contrary, or whether its mere nonexistence suffices. Must it be said that a contrary to the existence of hearing and sight inheres in the blind and the deaf, or that hearing and sight do not inhere in them? Or do blindness and deafness mean the absence of hearing and sight?

If all that is required is the mere absence of perception, then nonexistence cannot constitute a veil. If, however, they are said to be two positively existing states ordinarily associated with perception, as some who affirm the attributes maintain, then it is known that two contraries cannot coexist. Yet calling sight and vision a veil because they cannot coexist with deafness and blindness is no more justified than calling deafness and blindness a veil because they cannot coexist with vision and hearing. Nor can it be said that either one prevents the other; rather, their coexistence is impossible.

Admittedly, when one of them inheres in a subject, should it be said that an incoming contrary cannot displace it, or that it ceases of itself so that the incoming contrary can arise? This too is disputed among those who affirm the persistence of accidents and those who deny it. The point is that, even on this supposition, it is not called a veil.