oneness amounts to applying the name of one of two mutually entailing things to the other. Yet you take what is designated here to be a particular essence and a determinate reality. This is not oneness, but something subsisting in its own right and distinct from other things.

If it is said, “But you have mentioned that some people conventionally call each member of a species an ‘individual,’” the reply is: “We explained the basis for this by reference to usage. Since the term ‘individual’ was applied to human beings and things resembling them, they said, ‘Man is a species comprising individuals’—that is, particular entities that are individuals. Their intention was not individuality itself, but simply being one, so they extended the term to a broader meaning, as in analogous cases. The basis for this was not the mutual entailment mentioned above.”

The eighth point: One may say, grant that in Arabic the term “individual” applies to every determinate essence and particular reality—that is, anything that is one. But why do you claim that the hadith is to be understood in this sense, although it runs contrary to the apparent meaning?

If you say, “Because, in its literal sense, the term denotes a body, and that is ruled out,” there are two answers.

First: This objection applies equally to every name and attribute by which Allah is designated, for in linguistic usage, what it designates can only be a body