everything a likeness and counterpart of Him, as well as deviations concerning His names and signs that none but Allah can enumerate. For this is among the most unsound forms of linguistic analogy. Just as they have corrupted analogical reasoning concerning meanings apprehended by reason—going so far as to draw analogies between Allah and everything existent and nonexistent, as explained above—so too have they corrupted analogy in spoken expressions. Consequently, they must hold that every name denoting one thing is suitable for another, and that Allah Most High may be called by every name used for created beings.

The sixth point: One may say, grant that the term “individual” necessarily implies being one. But is applying the name of something to what it necessarily entails a universal rule, or is it permissible only in certain cases? If he makes this a universal rule, he is committed to more absurdities than can be discussed here. He would even have to give every attribute necessarily belonging to a human being, a horse, a tree, the sky, or the earth the name of that which possesses it. Indeed, the same would follow concerning Allah Most High’s attributes and names.

The seventh point: Grant that a thing’s name may be applied to what it necessarily entails. What is entailed, as you have said, is oneness. Thus, applying the term “individuality” to