and similar terms to every reality and particular entity. Everything—every substance or accident—could then be called by each of these names, just as logicians call it an “individual.” On this basis, Allah could be called by each of these names, with nothing intended beyond the particular entity and specific reality. One could even say, “No human being—or no horse, no bull, or no such-and-such—is more jealous than such-and-such,” meaning Allah. This necessarily follows from their position, and its absurdity needs no lengthy exposition.

Moreover, if this interpretation were sound, applying it to the word “form,” so that every particular reality is called a “form,” would be of the same kind. They would consequently have to call everything by the name of everything else, since everything possesses oneness, which is inseparable from its essence. If, on that account, a thing’s name may be made a designation for anything that is one, so that it may be applied to every particular entity and specific reality, the consequence is not merely that they themselves use it this way. Rather, it also follows that anyone hearing another person’s words may, on this basis, interpret the names they contain as referring to anything whatsoever, whenever he has evidence that what the name denotes is not intended.

All this is the worst kind of sophistry and Qarmatianism. It encompasses forms of associating partners with Allah by allowing Him to be called by every name used for created beings and by making