that a body which is a “person” must be one is false.

The fourth point is that being a single individual is not part of the word’s original lexical meaning. The word itself neither entails nor excludes any particular number. Anything beyond one, however, is excluded by default; it may also be excluded by verbal or situational indications, as when people say “one person,” or “A person came to me and said such-and-such to me.” Similarly, you say, “I rode a horse,” although “horse” includes its reins. Thus, it is the phrasing, rather than the word’s meaning in itself, that indicates that a single individual is meant. The same applies to the statement, “It was not one man who came to me, but two.” Here, “but two men” is a verbal indication showing that “man” denotes a single individual in this usage.

The fifth point is that this word’s indication of oneness, whether through its conventional meaning or through context, is like that of other comparable words, such as “human being,” “animal,” “horse,” “bull,” “donkey,” “someone standing,” “someone sitting,” and the like. If these words’ indication of oneness justifies applying a name to oneness, then it must be permissible to apply all these names