derived by inference. If the knowledge that Allah Most High is above the world is clearer in both innate disposition and revelation than the claim that all bodies came into being, I am not obliged to abandon what is plainly known by innate disposition for fear of having to deny something that is not equally clear in this respect.” This answer is plain and evident.

In sum, the entailment he mentions—namely, that this requires reasoning analogous to the philosophers’ argument entailing the eternity of time—is either valid in reality or invalid. If it is invalid, the counterargument fails. If it is valid, either the consequent must be true or the antecedent must be false; it does not specifically require the antecedent to be false. That being so, our knowledge that the consequent is false is no clearer than our knowledge that the antecedent is true. Rather, the truth of the antecedent is clearer in both revelation and reason. On this supposition, therefore, the consequent cannot be false, and the counterargument is invalid. The philosopher likewise argues in this way, as becomes clear from:

The seventh argument:

The philosopher says: “My knowledge that, of two existing things, one must either coexist with the other or precede it is self-evident and innate. As for your statement that this is like the corporealist’s assertion, ‘Of two existing things, one must either be co-located with the other or separate from it,’ I reply: This analogy is either valid or invalid. If it is invalid, it poses no objection to my position. If it is valid, I must accept the analogy, and that would entail