the faces of created beings, and a hand unlike their hands. It is well known that a face and a hand, in the sense they have described, cannot be accepted by conception and imagination.”

The response is:

We do not concede that this is inconceivable; it can be conceived just as analogous matters and their concomitants can. Rather, conceiving of faces and hands unlike those of created beings is like conceiving of an essence unlike created essences, and of hearing, sight, knowledge, and will that are in no way of the same kind as theirs. For the essence is an entity subsisting in its own right, and these are attributes belonging to it and intrinsic to it. None of these is of the same kind as created entities or the attributes belonging to them and intrinsic to them, even though the terms used have a common meaning.

To say, “Conception and imagination cannot accept this with regard to the face,” is like someone else saying, “Conception cannot accept this with regard to knowledge.” This is the position of those who deny the attributes.

It is also like saying, “Conception and imagination cannot accept