external reality and existing in its own right, rather than merely the attributes inherent in it, such as knowledge and power—although these have a mental image and description. For the existence of these mental images necessarily presupposes the existence of what they represent; otherwise, this would be ignorance, not knowledge. Thus, whether “image” means the external image or the mental image, it cannot mean merely an attribute inherent in the essence and its corresponding mental representation.

Second, concerning his statement that Adam was distinguished from all other individual beings and bodies by knowledge and power: if he means that Adam was distinguished from his descendants, this is not so. If he means that Adam was distinguished from the angels and jinn, then Adam was not distinguished simply by possessing knowledge and power. The angels may know things Adam does not know, just as they can do things he cannot do, although Allah also taught him things the angels did not know. This is especially pertinent according to the majority of the Jahmiyyah among the Muʿtazilah, the philosophers, and others like them, who claim that the angels are superior to the prophets. This is also one of the positions held by the author of Ta’sīs. Whether the prophets or the angels are superior, however, there is no doubt