The thirty-eighth argument:

It may be said: Suppose they have affirmed for Him a conceivable distinctness from some existing things. His distinctness from creation must be greater than the distinctness of any one thing from any other. They must therefore affirm for Him a distinctness greater than that of one accident from another or from its substrate, and of one substance from another. This likewise requires them to affirm distinctness in attribute, called distinctness in reality or quality, and distinctness in magnitude, called distinctness in direction or quantity. His distinctness in these two respects must thus be greater than any known distinctness between one created being and another, for nothing is like Him in any attribute ascribed to Him. Affirming some forms of distinctness while excluding others, however, entails that He resembles created beings, and that His resemblance to some created beings is greater than their resemblance to one another. That is impossible.

This is clarified by the following:

The thirty-ninth argument:

Distinctness entails difference in reality, which is the opposite of likeness; wherever there is distinctness, it